3.4.3 Behaviourism

The belief that everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events, objects, and any substance(s) that exist).

Supervenience is one way dependence and is commonly explained as follows;

• x depends on y but not vice versa

• x supervened on y, if x depends entirely on y

• so there’s no change in x possible without a change in y

Local supervenience argues that the mind is dependent on the brain alone

Global supervenience argues that the mind supervenes of the entire universe, this leads to pan-psychism

Either mental properties (and the mind) are physical or they supervene upon the physical body

All propositions about mental states can be reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements.

Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (i.e. propositions that use ordinary language).

• Analytical claims are claims about the meanings of words or concepts

• Analytic reductions are concerned with the meaning of terms

• An analytic reduction occurs when one shows that the meaning of talk about something is equivalent to the meaning of talk about another thing 

• This reduction occurs through analysis of language alone without investigation into how the world really is

• The problem of interaction

  • behaviourism denies that the mind and body are separate so there is no interaction issue

  • Proper analysis of our talk of minds will show that it concerns observable physical behaviour so there is no observable immaterial substance in causal interaction with the body 

• The problem of other minds

  • Minds are not private or non-physical and so their existence can be verified empirically (through observing behaviours)

  • So solipsism isn’t an issue

The error of assigning to something a quality or an action which can only properly be assigned to things of another category.

Ryle uses the example of Imagine a person being shown around a university. After they had been shown the various buildings, they then asked ‘but where is the university?’ They had made a categorical error thinking the university belonged to the category of ‘building’, rather than in the category of ‘a collection of buildings’

• Ryle argues that Descartes makes a category mistake in assuming that the mind is a non-physical thing:

  • Just because the mind is not a physical thing, that doesn’t mean it must be a non-physical thing. 

  • Instead the mind might not be a ‘thing’ at all

  • Ryle argues that the language we use to describe the mind confuses us about the logical category it belongs to:

    • The terms ‘state’ and ‘process’ appear to relate only to physical things

    • Yet we refer to mental states and processes

    • This leads us to think that the mind must also be a ‘thing’

    • Descartes is unable to find this physical ‘thing’ so concludes that the mind must be non-physical, based on the incorrect assumption that the mind is some type of ‘thing’

He suggests Descartes is arguing for the dogma of the ghost in the machine

• that the term ‘mind’ simply refers to a set of behavioural dispositions

  • For example if we describe someone as scared, we aren't describing their mental state but their inclination/disposition to make scared facial expressions and run away

  • Saying “he felt angry” = saying “he exhibited certain behaviours such as reddening, clenching his fists and shouting”

  • Ryle illustrates this further with an analogy of the brittle nature of glass

    • ‘Brittleness’ is not a physical thing yet we don’t conclude that it must be a non-physical thing

    • Instead we agree that ‘brittleness’ simply refers to the tendency/disposition of glass to shatter upon impact

    • Brittleness refers to the behavioural dispositions of glass

    • Likewise, the ‘mind’ refers to a set of human behavioural dispositions

      Ryle’s claim that the mind should be seen in the category ‘behaviours’ rather than the category ‘substance’ is the claim made by behaviourism

He doesn’t prove Descartes wrong, he simply explains that if Descartes is wrong then it’s because of his category mistake.

Meaning Ryle’s argument is an If… then… argument

A statement has meaning if it can be verified empirically or analytically

 Virtue of their meaning

Virtue of the way the world is

The set of conditions which make the statement true

That statements about the mind are meaningless unless verifiable

In dualism, you can’t verify mental statements analytically nor empirically as they are private

So they are meaningless

This is counterintuitive as we obviously can talk meaningfully about other people’s minds

The verification principle cannot be verified analytically or empirically. It is therefore meaningless by its own standards.

The verification principle is a tautology

It can also be reworded as a definition (so we can’t treat it in the same way as we treat other propositions) as it would be self defining/a tautology/verifiable analytically

• Assuming that mental states are private, they are meaningless

• Mental states are not meaningless and so there must be a way to verify them and they must thus not be private (instead they’re observable behaviours)

  • For a word to be meaningful there must be rules determining its use which you can use to tell if the word is being used correctly

    • E.g. describing a cat as a dog is wrong

  • If mental states are private and subjective then there could be no such rules for them making them meaningless

    • e.g. if pain is private there is no rule for when it can be used and so its meaningless

    • But the term pain isn't meaningless

• Therefore mental states must be publicly observable and empirically verifiable since mental language clearly cannot be meaningless

• So Behaviourists say that mental states are behaviour

Behaviour

All physical events that can (in principle) be empirically observed

Includes those physical events which can only be observed using apparatus

These are expressed in purely the language of physics

These are actions because the person does it, e.g. crying, swearing

Action = An event performed by an agent guided by the intention of the agent

Behaviour = A purely physical event, described in the language of physics

‘Anger’ goes to ‘Clenching fists’ (action) goes to ‘Finger muscles contracting etc’ (behaviours)

Physicalist statements

Statements of physics

A proneness or a potential to behave in a certain way (in neutral circumstances)

In terms of hypothetical propositions

Ryle thinks mental statements can be translated into ordinary language (whilst Hempel says it can only be translated into physical language)

Soft behaviourism speaks of analysing in terms of compared to fully translating mental states (as physical behaviourism does)

A full translation without loss of meaning appears impossible as particular mental states may be realised by different behaviours.

Can there really be a full translation into physical behaviour?

• how do you convey intention - doing something accidentally vs doing something intentionally 

  • For example, the action ‘Nathan kicks a ball’ can be translated as ‘the muscles of Nathan’s leg contracts and then relaxes with the result that the foot comes into contact with the ball and propels it through the air ‘

  • But the description could equally mean ‘Nathans leg cramped and he accidentally kicked the ball’ so there is a loss of meaning - nathan's intention

• However, if you actually did describe everything up to the minute physical level - tracking the eye, neurons firing etc, then there would be a clear difference between accidentally and purposefully kicking something 

• If the behaviours are in fact the same, then surely the actions are also the same

  • But is neural activity actually behaviours? He appears to have strayed into mind-brain identity theory (so faces the same issues)

• Soft behaviourism speaks of analysing in terms of compared to fully translating mental states (as physical behaviourism does)

  • Soft behaviourism allows that there is a loss of meaning 

• It also allows for a common-sense view of behaviours

  • They are observable with the naked eye

‘The further objection will perhaps be raised that men can feign. Thus, though a criminal at the bar may show physical symptoms of mental disorder, one would nevertheless be justified in wondering whether his mental confusion was ‘real’ or only simulated’ (Hempel)

Example: 

• Imagine a person on trial for a murder of which they are clearly guilty. 

• If the person has a mental disorder, their sentence will be significantly less harsh than if they are clear headed. 

• The problem is, the person has no mental disorder. 

• Nonetheless, they want to reduce their sentence, so they feign the symptoms of schizophrenia. 

• This person happens to be a perfect actor (they are able to feign ALL the physical behaviours associated with schizophrenia)

• If hard behaviourism is true, then the perfect actor, as long as they perfectly replicate the behaviours of remorse, is surely remorseful. 

• This, intuitively, seems untrue, even nonsensical

• As far as a normal human observer can tell, there may be no observable difference between the remorseful person, and the perfect actor feigning remorse 

• However a ‘more penetrating examination’, observing everything that is in principle observable would reveal whether the person was feigning sadness or actually sad, since even someone with a gift for acting cannot fake such behaviours. 

• Such an examination would involve looking at processes in the nervous system, or other physiological symptoms, rather than merely voluntary actions.

He collapses into MBTIT

• Someone feigning schizophrenia is disposed to not say they hear voices under neutral circumstances (regardless of whether they do so)

• So you can’t say they are schizophrenic

• To say that someone holds a certain mental state eg. anger can mean an infinite number of different things (the list of verification conditions is infinitely long).

•  An angry person can be jumping up and down or sitting stock still, talking non-stop or utterly silent, hitting others or hitting themself, screaming or being passive aggressive 

• In fact, anger can express itself in all behaviour

• Therefore, how can behaviour capture the meaning of a mental state, since the verification conditions would look the same for anger as for happiness (ie. would contain all behaviours)

• The verification of happiness and anger could be identical - e.g. smiling/laughing angrily

  • This is problematic as hard behaviourism relies on the verification principle

• You also can't say that two people are experiencing the same feelings if they are displaying different behaviours

• Plus Hempel’s full translation would need to include all the possible ways mental states can be manifested in behaviour

  • As the list is indefinite this is impossible

  • So behaviourism can't complete its aim to analyse mental states into exclusively physical behavioural ones

Dispositions are not infinite and so you can distinguish between mental states.

• There is no way of analysing a mental state purely referencing behaviour 

  • One cannot conclude that i am thirsty (mental state) purely from watching me drink something (behaviour)

  • I could instead believe the drink is poisoned (mental state) and feel suicidal (mental state) hence why i drink the drink

  • But you could not have inferred my suicidal mental state purely from my behaviours (drinking the drink)

  • It is only explained through reference to my belief that the drink is poisoned (mental state)

• So you can only explain/infer mental states through reference to other mental states - this is circular 

• So behavioural analysis can’t be completed and behaviourism fails

• PLUS it’s clear that mental states cannot be analysed fully in terms of the language of physics

soft behaviourism allows for the use of ‘ordinary language’ so the circularity criticism is not an issue

They don’t account for thinking

• E.g. daydreaming about the sea - no observable behaviours, arguably no behavioural dispositions

• Response:

  • Thinking isn't always private and internal

    • E.g. thinking through a sum on paper

    • Thinking out loud

    • Thinking through motions

  • But this still doesn’t account for daydreaming/actually private and internal thinking

• Hilary putnam asks us to imagine a super-spartans

  • Trained not only to suppress their pain behaviour but to suppress their disposition towards pain behaviour

  • What happens when one steps on a nail? Do they not feel pain?

  • A soft behaviourist (and hard behaviourist) would say no 

  • Putnam thinks this is ridiculous

    • But this bding counterintuitive doesn't mean it isn't true

  • Since the idea of Super-Spartans is not contradictory it would seem that our concept of pain cannot be reduced to behavioural concepts. 

  • Putnam concludes that pain behaviour is a symptom of being in pain rather than constitutive of it

• Behavioural dispositions are inclinations to behaviours in neutral circumstances

• If they hadn't been trained (if they were in neutral circumstances) they would be disposed to show pain

• So they still experience pain (more intuitive)

  • But given their training do they still have the disposition to show pain?

  • e.g. if you chemically altered a substance so that it can’t dissolve in water, is it still soluble because without the alteration it would dissolve?

• Dualists will urge that I am aware from my own experience that mental states have a subjective and private dimension.

• The experiences of qualia, in particular, have a specific quality which I am directly acquainted with.

• This subjective quality is not something that can be rendered in terms of behaviour. 

• Any description of my behaviour cannot include what it is like for me to experience a toothache, for example.

• So while behaviourism might seem plausible as an account of how we ascribe mental states to others, it cannot do justice to the lived experience of mental life as it is experienced from the subjective point of view.

Introspection is not necessarily infallible, the physicalist would simply say we are mistaken as non-physical qualia cannot actually exist.

There is an important difference between the way I come to know about my own mental states as opposed to the mental states of others. - a simple flaw of behaviourism

• To determine what mental state someone else is in I only have their behaviour to go on. 

  • e.g. I assume Jess is hungry because I hear her stomach growling

• However, to discover what mental state I am in I have no need of behavioural evidence. 

  • If I am hungry, I can tell because I am directly acquainted with the sensation of hunger

  • I don’t need to listen to my stomach to realise I’m hungry

• Behaviourism is unable to explain this asymmetry. 

  • It suggests that knowledge of my own mental states is arrived at in the same way as is knowledge of others' mental states, by observation of my behaviour.

• The fact that I don't need to observe my behaviour in order to know what mental state I am suggests that mental states are not equivalent to behaviours 

• This shows that behaviourism is false.

• Ryle claims that we still realise our mental states through ‘paying attention’ to our own ‘silent behaviours’, as we do to the outer behaviours of others

• So there is no real difference between our experience of our own mental states and our experience of other people’s mental states

• We just have privileged access to our ‘inner behaviours’

What are inner behaviours?

• But if they refer to  processes in the nervous system, or other physiological symptoms then the theory appears to collapse into MBTIT

• If they don’t refer to these processes, Ryle appears to be speaking of the dualist idea of private experience, straying from behaviourism

• Everyday experience suggests that our mental states have a causal influence on our behaviour.

  •  e.g. if I am in pain I normally assume that this pain is part of what causes me to cry

• But the behavioural analysis says that the desire is to be analysed in terms of my behaviour. 

  • So the pain is the act of crying (among other things) not what causes the crying

• This is counter-intuitive

• Plus the common-sense approach provides an explanation of our behaviour.

  • I cry because I am in pain

  • Behaviourism has no explanation of this sort to offer 

  • If mental states are just behaviour and dispositions to behave, then we cannot explain why we act as we do.

• The fact that behaviourism is in conflict with common sense doesn't show that it is false. 

• Common sense may be wrong. 

• It is reasonable to accept this common -sense approach given that the arguments of behaviourists are shit (as above)

  • Ockham’s razor

• So, given the advantages of our everyday view of these matters over the behaviourist's revised account, it is reasonable to stick to the common- sense picture.