Studied by 1 personHow would act utilitarians approach stealing?
An action is right if it maximises happiness and wrong if it does not
So the end (happiness) can justify the means even when the means is illegal
Can justify any kind of stealing
You can steal a rich kid’s phone as they wont be that upset (they can buy another easily) and you will be very happy
Counter-intuitive
So if stealing, on some occasion creates greater happiness than not stealing, its morally right on that occasion
But usually it causes greater unhappiness so is usually wrong
Stealing out of dire need from someone wealthy is generally ok
Robin hood style stealing is generally ok
Stealing to prevent harm is generally ok
Is this counter-intuitive?
For many what makes illegal acts bad is committing the act not just the consequences
How would rule utilitarians approach stealing?
An action is right if, and only if, it complies with those rules which, if everybody followed them, would lead to the greatest happiness
In general theft is wrong as the pain caused to the victim tends to far outweigh the pleasure gained by the thief
So people should follow the rule ‘Do not steal’
BUT should the rule be ‘Do not steal’ or more complicated, allowing for exceptions
(strong vs weak rule util)
How would the universalization formula of Kantian ethics be applied to stealing?
‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’
If everyone stole what they wanted, property rights would disappear so it would be impossible to steal
As the maxim ‘I can steal what I want’ cannot be universalised
We have a perfect duty not to steal
Can some maxims involving stealing be universalised e.g. ‘to steal to save a life’
But this is hypothetical not categorical
Can't change maxim to ‘to save a life, even if by stealing
This is still hypothetical
How would the humanity formulation of Kantian ethics be applied to stealing?
‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’
Stealing involves not allowing someone to make an informed choice
So it bypasses the owner’s autonomy
Involves treating them as a means to an end
You have a perfect duty not to steal
How would a strict Aristotelian perspective approach stealing?
Theft is never a mean
According to Aristotle, stealing is always an injustice because it deprives a person what is justly and fairly theirs.
This is due to Aristotle’s Narrow Justice (from Nicomachean Ethics) - Justice as Equality
‘Equality’ here refers to not grasping for more than what is fair
The just person wants their fair share - no more, no less
Even in extreme cases,e.g stealing £1 from a billionaire to buy bread to save a starving child who will otherwise die, Aristotle would still likely say that stealing is wrong.
Aristotle distinguishes between unjust actions and unjust states of affairs:
A starving child may very well be an unjust state of affairs (an unfortunate situation) but that’s just the way the world is sometimes.
According to Aristotle, it is much worse to deliberately and freely choose to commit unjust actions – even if you are committing these unjust actions to counteract unjust states of affairs
How would virtue ethicists approach stealing?
Consider the context of the action
E.g robin hood robs from the rich and gives to the poor within the context of an unjust society
Consider both moral and intellectual virtues
If robin hood had the virtue practical wisdom, he would have assessed the options he had to achieve his goal and chosen the right one - stealing from the rich
If he also possessed a virtuous character then his act of theft must have sprung from the right goal - virtues of benevolence or charity
So if stealing is done because of the agents practical wisdom and virtuous character it is permissible
Consider other available choices
Could Robin Hood have set up a charity instead?
Practical wisdom would tell you the right thing to do
Consider the long term effect on someone’s character
If the theft is a one-off action, it won’t become a habit/trait
If it is part of a pattern of lawlessness then it shouldn’t be done
How would Bentham and Mill respond to eating animals?
Bentham: ‘The question is not ‘can they reason? nor, can they talk? but, can they suffer?’
Happiness is good, pain is bad, no matter what creature feels it
Mill: animals count for less due to distinction between higher and lower pleasures - since animals are only capable of lower pleasures, their pleasure is worth less.
How would Peter Singer respond to eating animals?
Says that to privilege human pain and pleasure over animals is speciesist and is immoral
But surely there are important differences between people and animals, e.g. reason, emotional depth, self-awareness, moral agency etc
Response: these are not relevant to causing suffering (an animal will still suffer even without reason etc)
Peter Singer is a preference utilitarian
Due to their animals limited rationality, it's hard to attribute certain preferences to them - they don’t necessarily have a preference not to die (as animals do ot understand what death is)
But they prefer not to feel pain
So painless slaughtering isn’t a problem
We can distinguish between different species as long as the distinction is based on RELEVANT qualities
Singer says it is worse to kill an ape for meat, than to kill a cow for meat.
Apes have long term relationships, grieve for long periods of time, have a sense of justice, can solve complex puzzles, and have strong emotions
What are the implications of the utilitarian attitude towards eating animals?
We should stop eating meat if the pain caused to the animals outweighs our own pleasure
Farming conditions matter:
If we can nourish ourselves in ways other than factory farming we should do that instead as factory farming is an unnecessary cause of pain in animals
But killing animals in a painless way is morally permissible
Arguably, if it wasn’t for farming animals for food, many animals would never have existed and so would never have been able to experience pleasure and pain in the first place.
So if the animals farmed for food have an overall happy life and a painless death, eating animals is morally justifiable because it results in a net increase of pleasure
How would the universalization formula from Kantian ethics approach eating animals?
Kant would say the maxim “to eat animals”
Has no contradiction in conception (the maxim is conceivable universalised)
And has no contradiction in will (we can rationally will that it is universalised) that results from the maxim “to eat animals”.
Arguably many people would not will for the maxim’s reverse ( “to not eat animals”) to be universalised as If no one ate meat, there would be no use for the farming of animals resulting in unemployment etc
How would the humanity formulation from Kantian ethics apply to eating animals?
Human beings are ends in themselves:
We have a rational will and therefore autonomy This is what gives us moral worth.
Animals are not rational, and so are not ends in themselves (in opposition to Bentham who asks ‘can they suffer?’ - Kant asks ‘can they reason?’)
So they can be treated as means to our ends.
A human being is ‘a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion’
What are the criticisms of the Kantian ethics approach to eating animals?
This disregard would apply to human beings that cannot reason
Children
People with disabilities preventing reasoning
Those in a coma
What about animals that can reason?
e.g. apes
What does Kant explicitly say about animals?
We have no duties to animals, but we do have duties to people and to ourselves regarding animals
We must not become unkind through how we treat animals
We have an imperfect duty to sympathise with the suffering of others.
Since treating animals cruelly might detract from the ability to sympathise with humans, we have a kind of indirect imperfect duty to treat animals humanely
“violent and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being’s duty to himself (the duty to develop morally)…”
What are the implications of what Kant says about eating animals?
Being an abattoir worker who slaughters animals cruelly is wrong
but eating the meat from these animals in a detached way is fine (since we’re not harming our ability to sympathise)
What would Aristotle say about eating animals?
Aristotle’s discussion of eudaimonia is concerned with the good life for human beings specifically.
Animals, unlike humans, are not capable of reason and so eudaimonia doesn’t apply to them.
So our moral concern with eudaimonia has little place for considering animals, at least as far as their pursuing their own eudaimonia is concerned.
Aristotle’s account of the human soul demonstrates the difference between humans and animals
‘Plants exist for the sake of animals, and the other animals for the good of humans … for our service and our food’
So Aristotle wouldn’t have an issue with eating animals
What would virtue ethicists say about eating animals?
There are virtuous and vicious ways of treating animals
virtue ethics is based on the idea of a virtuous character
How would a virtuous character treat animals?
What does Rosalind Hursthouse say about eating animals?
Techniques used by modern factory farming are cruel and lacking the virtue of compassion
We do not actually need factory farming to exist (15 billion chickens killed a year), so it is rather greed than necessity (greed= the vice of intemperance)
Consider also the greed of those running factory farms for profit
What does Cora Diamond say about eating animals?
argues that animals are a different kind of being to humans and so we shouldn’t treat their happiness as equal (as Singer says above).
But they are nevertheless living beings that can have good and bad lives.
To completely ignore this, as some factory farming practices do, demonstrates the vices of callousness and selfishness.
In contrast, rearing your own chickens and treating them humanely – even if you do ultimately eat them – demonstrates the virtues of sympathy and respect.
What are the potential implications of the virtue ethics view on eating animals?
Virtue ethics might acknowledge how our treatment of animals reflects upon our character and argue that whether eating animals is acceptable depends on if it is done in the right way and for the right reason.
Eating animals might sometimes fall within the golden mean, but not always.
How would an act utilitarian approach telling lies?
Lying is acceptable if it maximises happiness/minimises pain
In such cases lying is the correct thing to do
In weighing up pain/pleasure you have to consider that in general
People don’t like being lied to
People want to be trusted and lying undermines this - weakens faith in humanity
Lying frequently causes pain when discovered
Lying often causes stress to the liar
So lying comes with an inbuilt negative outcome which benefits of a ‘good’ lie must outweigh
Undiscovered lies might have to consequence so are moral
And although act utilitarians deny that truth-telling/promise-making comes with an inherent moral obligation
Truth-telling should generally be the default
What would a rule utilitarian say about telling lies?
The rule ‘tell the truth’ tends to maximise utility so for strong rule utilitarians its always wrong to lie
Weak rule utilitarians would in general tell the truth but occasionally lie if lying would clearly maximise pleasure
Reflects most people’s intuition
What would preference utilitarians say about telling lies?
Asks whether a lie would satisfy more preferences
Most people have a preference to be told the truth
But sometimes (e.g. did my speech go well?) when the questionnaire might prefer to be lied to
Undiscovered lies can still be immoral if they go against someone’s preference to hear the truth
So moral weight of the lie starts immediately
What would Kantian ethics say about telling lies?
Lying is not a universalizable maxim
So we have a perfect moral duty not to lie
So in the case of the axe-murderer asking where your friend is, you have a duty to tell the truth (or at least stay silent)
The maxim “i will lie to save an innocent person’s life” is conceivably universalizable and one could rationally will of its universalisation
But Kant says maxims must be as general as possible
But narrowing lying to circumstances like this seems legitimate and morally relevant
We also have an imperfect duty to help others so surely lying is the right thing to do here?
Kant’s conclusion is counterintuitive
How would the humanity formulation of Kantian ethics approach telling lies?
Lying corrupts our ability to make free, rational choices.
Each lie I tell contradicts the part of me that gives me moral worth.
My lies rob others of their freedom to choose rationally.
When my lie leads people to decide other than they would have known the truth, I have harmed their human dignity and undermined their autonomy.
Kant believed that to value ourselves and others as ends instead of means, we have perfect duties (i.e., no exceptions) to avoid damaging, interfering with, or misusing the ability to make free decisions; in other words - no lying.
What are the responses to the Kantian ethicist approach to telling lies, and how does Kant further respond?
The axe-murderer is clearly aiming to undermine the autonomy of my friend
He has chosen to leave the rightful condition and enter a state of nature
So he has given up his entitlement to be treated as a person with full autonomy and we can lie to him
Similarly Kant would say that if someone attacks you, you can defend yourself
BUT BUT
Kant still insists on telling the truth
Maybe because he only discusses this scenario in a paper about the law
Generally speaking when lying breaks the law it is fundamentally wrong and telling the truth is always legally right
So maybe he was only making a legal point in his paper
How would Aristotle approach telling lies?
Aristotle condemns such dishonesty as bad and reprehensible
‘Falsehood is in itself bad and reprehensible, while the truth is a fine and praiseworthy thing’ - Aristotle, Ethics, Book IV, section 7
One way of understanding this is to say that lying is an act, (like adultery and murder) that has no mean
Lying is already an excess or deficiency in some way, and cannot be virtuous.
An alternative interpretation is to say that truth is a final end, something that we should seek not for some further purpose, but for its own sake.
This doesn’t mean that lying is always wrong.
Pleasure is a final end, but we should not always pursue it – there are appropriate and inappropriate ways of doing so.
Perhaps the same can be said of truthfulness.
His remarks suggest that there are better and worse motives for lying
to lie about what you have or can do, just because you enjoy lying, is contemptible but ‘futile rather than bad’.
To lie in order to gain or protect one’s reputation is not particularly blameworthy, since having a good reputation, in Aristotle’s eyes, is good.
Someone who lies to gain money, on the other hand, ‘is an uglier character’.
We will need practical wisdom to judge when lying is justified and when it isn’t.
To deceive someone virtuously, we would need to do so at the right time, with the right motive, about the right truths, and in the right way.
There are ways of not sharing the truth other than lying.
Perhaps the virtuous person will exhaust all the alternatives first before resorting to a lie.
What would virtue ethicists say about telling lies?
In all accounts of VE we need to develop an honest character
As honesty contributes to our eudaimonia - we flourish as individuals when we are honest and flourish as a community when there is trust
So to develop an honest character, you have to practise being honest as honesty and dishonesty are both habits
Practical wisdom enables us to determine when the general V rule ‘be honest, don’t lie’ can be bent or broken
Ethicist Peter Geach gives the example of St Athanus who found an alternative to lying (not telling the truth without actually lying) to suggest we should look at our range of options and only lie as a last resort
So lying on occasion might help us do the right thing/find the mean
Situations exist where the right and virtuous thing is to lie (e.g. Kant's axe-murder) and as long as we don’t make a habit of it lying is fine
What is important to consider about simulated killing?
The difference between watching a killing (e.g. in a film) and playing the role of the killer (e.g. in a video game)
The effects simulated killing has on a person’s character (e.g. whether exposure to simulated killing makes them more violent)
Whether simulated killing is wrong in itself (in the UK, for example, video games involving rape and paedophilia are illegal even though they’re just simulations – why not murder too?)
How would an act utilitarian approach the situation of acting as the killer?
The obvious response of act utilitarianism would be that simulated killing is morally acceptable.
The person watching the film or playing the video game gets some enjoyment from the simulated killing, and the person being killed doesn’t actually suffer because it’s only fictional.
In this situation, simulated killing results in a net gain of happiness.
Happiness is also gained from being part of successful industries supplying jobs, creating wealth and advancing technology
Video games can have benefits in terms of motor skills
Often secondary pleasures come from chatting with friends about games etc
BUT
Could simulated killing lead to real harm?
e.g. an increased risk of killing, aggressive behaviour, becoming less responsive to distress, approval of violence
This is an empirical question
Evidence suggests that in the short term there might be negative consequences but only in boys or people with violent personalities (Young, Ethics in the Virtual World)
So for some, acting the killer is wrong
as an increased risk of killing, aggressive behaviour, becoming less responsive to distress, approval of violence leads to far more pain than pleasure gained from playing
How would Mill approach simulated killing?
Real harm caused must be weighed against real pleasure of playing the game
How much pleasure do such games really bring
Mill might say it is a lower pleasure
This would alter the result of the utilitarian calculus - maybe pain would outweigh pleasure gained in this case
Also, it may be morally better according to Mill to read a book over playing a video game as the latter is a higher mental pleasure so maximising utility would require reading over playing video games
Mill also argued that the secondary principle of liberty should be key to utilitarianism
We should all be free to pursue our own pleasures as long as we don’t harm others,
these considerations support the difficult to apply objection to utilitarianism
How would utilitarians in general approach being part of an audience to simulated killing?
Depends on the consequences
Same as simulated killing
But playing the killer might have very different psychological consequences of watching a make-believe killing
A simulated immoral killing can be presented as immoral with the killer as the bad guy
Or it can be presented as moral - the morality of the work of fiction disagrees with our own
Is it wrong to imagine that what is immoral is moral
How is the universalization formulation applied to the situation of acting as the killer?
‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’
It is conceivable and can be rationally willed that the maxim “engage with simulated killing” be universalised
So playing the killer is no violation of one’s duty
How would the humanity formulation be applied to the situation of acting as a killer?
‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end’
We have no duty to characters on a screen
But arguably playing the killer constantly is a violation of one’s imperfect duty towards oneself
If you constantly play video games, are you really treating yourself as inherently valuable?
If cruel fictional actions encourage real cruelty then it also violates our duty to treat others as inherently valuable
Could we fail to develop our moral identity (one of our duties) ?
We must not become unkind through how we play violently
We have an imperfect duty to sympathise with the suffering of others/to not be violent towards others
Since acting the killer might detract from the ability to sympathise with humans, we have a kind of indirect imperfect duty to not play the killer
How would Kantian ethics be applied to the situation of being an audience to simulated killing?
The same as with acting the killer so application of both formulations, and then their individual results.
How would virtue ethicists approach the situation of acting as a killer?
Virtues are traits that help us achieve eudaimonia - ‘living well and faring well;
We become virtuous by doing virtuous acts
The question is,would simulating unjust acts develop an unjust character?
Would a virtuous person engage in simulated killing?
What is the right way, right motive, right time regarding simulated killing?
Should we take pleasure from simulated killing? How does this reflect on the character of the player?
The mean is relative to the individual
Someone who cannot keep the game and reality separate should not play
Perhaps someone who can draw both a conceptual and emotional distinction is not at risk of real psychological effects (empirical claim)
How would virtue ethicists approach the situation of an audience to simulated killing?
In Aristotle’s poetics he wrote about how watching a tragedy is cathartic for the audience
Emotions often build up throughout the play until a climactic scene triggered cathartic release and the emotion is home
This safe ‘cleansing’ of our negative emotions is seen by Aristotle as a part of the education of our character
By watching tragedies and killings in a fictional context, we can practise feeling the right emotion at the right time etc and so help the development of virtue
How would meta-ethics apply to stealing?
Moral realism:
Naturalism: “Stealing is wrong” is true if stealing has the natural property of wrongness (e.g. because it causes sadness, and sadness is a natural property)
Non-naturalism: “Stealing is wrong” is true if stealing has the non-natural property of wrongness
Moral anti-realism:
Error theory: “Stealing is wrong” is false because the property of wrongness doesn’t exist
Non-cognitivism:
Emotivism: “Stealing is wrong” just means “Boo! Stealing!” and so is not capable of being true or false
Prescriptivism: “Stealing is wrong” means “Don’t steal!” and so is not capable of being true or false
How would meta-ethics apply to eating animals?
Moral realism:
Naturalism: “Eating animals is wrong” is true if eating animals has the natural property of wrongness (e.g. because wrongness is a natural property such as pain)
Non-naturalism: “Eating animals is wrong” is true if eating animals has the non-natural property of wrongness
Moral anti-realism:
Error theory: “Eating animals is wrong” is false because the property of wrongness doesn’t exist
Non-cognitivism:
Emotivism: “Eating animals is wrong” just means “Boo! Eating animals!” and so is not capable of being true or false
Prescriptivism: “Eating animals is wrong” means “Don’t eat animals!” and so is not capable of being true or false
How would meta-ethics apply to telling lies?
Moral realism:
Naturalism: “Telling lies is wrong” is true if telling lies has the natural property of wrongness
Non-naturalism: “Telling lies is wrong” is true if telling lies has the non-natural property of wrongness
Moral anti-realism:
Error theory: “Telling lies is wrong” is false because the property of wrongness doesn’t exist
Non-cognitivism:
Emotivism: “Telling lies is wrong” just means “Boo! Telling lies!” and so is not capable of being true or false
Prescriptivism: “Telling lies is wrong” means “Don’t tell lies!” and so is not capable of being true or false
How would meta-ethics apply to simulated killing?
Moral realism:
Naturalism: “Simulated killing is wrong” is true if simulated killing has the natural property of wrongness
Non-naturalism: “Simulated killing is wrong” is true if simulated killing has the non-natural property of wrongness
Moral anti-realism:
Error theory: “Simulated killing is wrong” is false because the property of wrongness doesn’t exist
Non-cognitivism:
Emotivism: “Simulated killing is wrong” just means “Boo! Simulated killing!” and so is not capable of being true or false
Prescriptivism: “Simulated killing is wrong” means “Don’t do simulated killing!” and so is not capable of being true or false
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